Wednesday, December 16, 2009

Special Operations Craft-Riverine [SOC-R]

USMC might say no to the JLTV...

this is via Aviation Week...

Marines May Not Wait For JLTV

By Bettina H. Chavanne

Dec 16, 2009

The U.S. Marines are in active talks with industry for a lightweight vehicle that may supplant the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), according to Commandant Gen. James Conway.
Conway told reporters at the Pentagon Dec. 15 that the JLTV is not only five years away, but is weighing in at 22,000 pounds, which he believes is too heavy for Marine Corps needs. Spearheaded by the U.S. Army and the Marines, the JLTV is intended as a Humvee replacement.
“Is that the vehicle we need to be buying?” Conway said. “You’re at risk if you stay with heavy vehicles.” The Marine Corps, Conway said, has been “serving as a second land army” and needs to “shuck the weight” of the many vehicles it has used in Iraq and Afghanistan.
An interim solution is to raise up-armored Humvees higher off the ground and equip them with V-hulls and a protective crew compartment.
“There are manufacturers out there who think they can do it for one-tenth the cost of a [new] vehicle,” Conway said. “We want to use our defense dollars wisely.”

 This is refreshing.  If the Humvee can actually be modified for continuous service then the service will save a ton of money.  Good news.

Must reads...
Commandant's warnings on JLTV
JLTV Program Site

Marines in Zad, Afghanistan...

When I first heard that the Assault Breacher Vehicle had been deployed to Afghanistan, all I could think is Huh????...... courtesy DVIDS....

Photo by Lance Cpl. Walter Marino
Marines with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, conduct combat operationsin Now Zad, Afghanistan, during Operation Cobra's Anger, Dec. 4.Operation Cobra's Anger disrupted enemy supply lines and communicationin Now Zad, once a safe haven for Taliban forces.

Photo by Lance Cpl. Walter Marino Marines with 3rd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, breach NowZad, Afghanistan, during Operation Cobra's Anger, Dec. 4. OperationCobra's Anger disrupted enemy supply lines and communication in NowZad, once a safe haven for Taliban forces.

Photo by Lance Cpl. Walter Marino
Marines with 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, conduct combat operationsin Now Zad, Afghanistan, during Operation Cobra's Anger, Dec. 4.Operation Cobra's Anger disrupted enemy supply lines and communicationin Now Zad, once a safe haven for Taliban forces.

LCS2...moving out at 52mph!


CS-21...why its a joke....

I don't think CS-21 is worth the paper its written on.  I'd love to see the classified versions of it, because as it stands now, its simply a cheering section for hopes and dreams.  I present the following passages with my comments in italics as proof...

Sea Control. The ability to operate freely at sea is one of the most
important enablers of joint and interagency operations, and sea control
requires capabilities in all aspects of the maritime domain, including
space and cyberspace. There are many challenges to our ability to exercise
sea control, perhaps none as significant as the growing number of
nations operating submarines, both advanced diesel-electric and nuclear
propelled. We will continue to hone the tactics, training and technologies
needed to neutralize this threat. We will not permit conditions under
which our maritime forces would be impeded from freedom of
maneuver and freedom of access, nor will we permit an adversary to
disrupt the global supply chain by attempting to block vital sea-lines
of communication and commerce. We will be able to impose local sea
control wherever necessary, ideally in concert with friends and allies, but
by ourselves if we must.

Really?  If this is a core foundation of this strategy then how do you explain the success of the pirates off North Africa?  Independent navies in the South China Sea are having more success.  The pirates are causing disruptions to the free flow of trade.  We aren't able to impose local sea control. Oh and where are those governmental agencies that aren't military (besides the State Dept, FBI and maybe DEA)...the ones that can make a real difference in this part of the world aren't there.  Not even aboard ship!

Maritime Security. The creation and maintenance of security at sea is
essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism,
weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.
Countering these irregular and transnational threats protects our
homeland, enhances global stability, and secures freedom of navigation
for the benefit of all nations. Our maritime forces enforce domestic
and international law at sea through established protocols such as the
Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR). We also join
navies and coast guards around the world to police the global commons
and suppress common threats.

Again I point to the lack of success.  New headquarters are being/have been established in Europe to combat this problem yet it persists.  What happens when a more formidable foe rears its head? Oh and that vaunted maritime Operational Threat Response Plan?  I'd love to see it in action or is it just another table top exercise?

Marines will continue to be employed as air-ground task forces operating
from amphibious ships to conduct a variety of missions, such as power
projection, but they will also be employed as detachments aboard a
wider variety of ships and cutters for maritime security missions. Sailors,
Marines, and Coast Guardsmen, teamed in various combinations of
security forces, mobile training teams, construction battalions, health
services, law enforcement, and civil affairs units to conduct security
cooperation and humanitarian assistance missions, illustrate adaptive
force packaging.

I include this because a certain Navy Captain over at Galhran's blog commented on the Marine Corps Vision 2025 and made the statement that the Marine Corps looked into the future and just saw MAGTF's!  WOW!

Enhance Awareness. To be effective, there must be a significantly
increased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA)
and expand intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability
and capacity. New partnerships with the world’s maritime commercial
interests and the maritime forces of participating nations will reduce
the dangerous anonymity of sea borne transport of people and cargoes.
Great strides have already been taken in that direction, and the National
Strategy for Maritime Security has mandated an even higher level of
interagency cooperation in pursuit of effective MDA. Maritime forces
will contribute to enhance information sharing, underpinning and
energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from
our shores as possible.

Again I point to the piracy problem, the first real Navy centric threat of this century.  ISR efforts have failed in the hunt for the hijackers.  Again CS-21 fails.

This thing is a joke and needs to be scrapped.  Acknowledge the mistake, correct it and move on. 

Must reads....

European Union Naval Force Somalia

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower

CS-21's Core Themes and Visions are enduring