Saturday, February 26, 2011

Gates turns his gaze toward the US Army.


via Military.com

Gates told the cadets that as the Army competes for money in the tightening economy, it must realize that high-end conflicts will mainly require Navy and Air Force engagements, not a head-on clash of big land forces. The Army must not lose its ability to wage the kind of irregular warfare it has honed on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, and be prepared to face off against insurgents, militia groups and rogue states.
Gates also warned the cadets that the U.S. so far has a perfect record of never accurately predicting what the next war will be. But one thing, he said, is certain.
Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should "have his head examined," Gates said.

16 comments :

  1. And what that means is...Let the cutting begin!

    If you're ruling out a big land army that means you don't need all those heavy tank/mech divisions. Actually, you don't need a good chunk of the manpower either.

    I hate to say it but Gates sounds like Rumsfeld with his lighter/faster phase. Gods help us.

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  2. exactly right....the transformation that Rummy was all about had to do with having much smaller forces...you gotta remember that the biggest driver of expenses in modern armies or rather professional armies is personnel costs.

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  3. The problem with this bunch is that the cuts they make won't result in a better army. Just one that is 'cheaper' and not as capable. I doubt it'll happen but they should move some of the heavy units to the reserves/NG. At least they might preserve some of the capabilities that way.

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  4. awesome point.

    make the reserves the home of the heavy divisions...you keep the light fighters on active duty...but the reserves will still need to be funded properly.

    thats an outstanding idea.

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  5. You'd still need the resources (time, money) to thoroughly train and equip those reserve formations, and/or keep a core or cadre in the active forces - which will be understrength/non-deployable untill call-up of their (reserve) troops.

    It's a bit like the Israeli system, where most of the heavy forces are reserve formations which can be called up within hours (which is unique to Israel and non-applicable to a similar US system of course).

    But it'll be all too easy to cut this "paper tiger" cadre force and thus reduce the effectiveness/readiness of the 'heavy reserve' divisions.

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  6. i sorta disagree Marcase.

    i guess it all depends on how 'involved' your reserve forces are. the Marine Corps has a very active reserve component that has sent personnel individually to units and entire companies/battalions to war and they've fought effectively.

    not wanting to slam the European experience with this or the early 70's/80's contribution in our own forces but its generally understood here (especially after a decade of war) that you can be called up to war so you better take it seriously.

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  7. Disagreement is good - fuels discussion ;).

    There was a US study about this 'reserve US Army' with the USMC and XVIII Abn Corps as RDF, but it got all snowed under by the 'rival' Force XXI plans (which itself morphed into Brigade Modular Force and FCS etc.)

    We all dislike stabilisation ops - aka nation building - as it means prolonged (active force) boots on the ground, but it's the aftermath of combat ops that appear the most troublesome (see Iraq) and what may be the most destabilizing, and in turn require the most effort.

    As the saying goes, winning the war (quickly) is easy, keeping the peace afterwards, not so much.

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  8. don't get me started on stabilization missions.

    the UN made an ass out of Bush. his thinking was to get in .. win the war.. and then turn it all over to the UN with European forces spearheading the effort.

    in a perfect world it probably would have been the ideal situation and would have possibly led to less violence (hard to hate the great satan if the great satan has left and only people handing out food from 'friendly' nations are left)...

    but it didn't work out that way.

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  9. You break it, you own it. Europeans don't want to clean up the mess afterwards.

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  10. I would suggest that any of the reserve forces created go into the reserves rather then the Guard. That would avoid the issue of who 'owns' the units.

    A Guard could still exist and be state controlled but be focused on internal security and disaster recovery. The Reserves would be strictly combat focused then.

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  11. Instead of worrying about force sizes or reserves, or whatnot, I'd like to hear someone actually give a situation where advanced armored forces will be needed and compare that list to the list of potential conflicts requiring advanced air and sea forces.

    Heavy Armor Needed:
    1. North Korea
    2. Russia

    Air and Sea Forces Alone:
    1. China
    2. Iran

    Notice that thouhg, at first glance those two lists seem equal, in reality the Russia scenario is highly unlikely, and in that case the US can rely on NATO forces, and the North Korea case does not require massive number of troops, because those troops won't reach the front lines before the war ends. (it'll take weeks to move an armored division from the US to the Korean peninsula. The war with North Korea will be decided within several days)

    But the Iran case is real and pressing and the China case is the biggest threat.

    Really, the Secretary's arguments are logical, the US faces a far stronger threat which requires air and sea power. And, if the US does not have unlimited money (which is true), then the US should prioritize those two areas.

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  12. but the Secretary contradicts himself.

    he says that we can't predict the next war, then he's trying to tailor forces to meet his view of the next war.

    you talk about the lack of heavy forces needed but i point to the Middle East.

    what if Syria and Iran decided to invade a friendly Iraq? would you want to enter into that conflict with just air or naval forces?

    would you want to do that with a middle wt Army? or if this sketch of a plan is outlined, an Infantry centric Army with few mechanized heavy units?

    What if China made a move for resources in the Middle East? Would you want to counter them with air and sea power alone with a heavy dose of 82nd, 101st and Marine Units?

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  13. I agree that armor is still needed, but in the supporting role Gates kind of mentions.

    TACAIR with smart munitions (BLU-108) will massacre large armor formations. Hellfires (from Apaches or UAVs) can attrite any leakers, followed by Javelin-equipped infantry.

    Armor is best used to outclass threats, so more as in Baghdad/Fallujah against entrenched enemies than open-field steel vs steel Kursk battles.

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  14. can you say that with confidence when the Israeli Trophy System is in full scale production and being placed on Merkava tanks?

    What happens when Hellfires, Javelins and their brothers are easily deflected or destroyed?

    Armor becomes king again.

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  15. Armor is king, but is meeting resistance.
    Yes, the Merkava is being fitted with Trophy and ERA, due to lessons learned in Gaza - not many T-72s there.

    Kind of my point; infantry AT weapons are becoming more effective, so armor has to beef up considerably - including infantry APC/IFV's.

    So armor will still be needed, just not in large formations. Sort of like the USMC uses tanks within a MEU; a handfull well employed can make a difference. If more tanks are needed, call in TACAIR first, mop up with Abrams afterwards.

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  16. Under the mandatory post-DADT, sensititivy rewrite:

    "Gates turns his gays toward the US Army"

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