via The National Interest.
But the problem in this case is that the death spiral won’t lead to the actual death of the F-35. The fighter has, effectively, become unkillable. In the wake of negative experiences with the B-2 Spirit, the F-22 Raptor, and several other programs, Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon worked very hard to ensure that no one could kill the F-35. Three US services committed to acquiring substantial numbers of Joint Strike Fighters, with only minimal hedging with respect to alternatives. International partners bought in, often at considerable political cost. The result is an aircraft that perhaps should undergo a “death spiral,” but cannot; no matter how expensive the cheap alternative to the F-22 becomes, it cannot be killed. It is what it is, and we’re stuck with it.&
The battle against the F-35, at least in the domestic context, was lost before anyone beyond Lockheed Martin thought about fighting it. We’ll build it, and for better or worse we’ll have to live with it. This is a lesson that Congress and the Pentagon should take to heart when considering the Next-Generation Bomber, the Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyer, and a variety of other major procurement programs. In retrospect, the United States should have hedged by devoting more attention to the F-22 (a position that this author, to his discredit, opposed at the time) or to legacy platforms. But the future of air warfare is hard to predict, and the F-35 may yet do extraordinary things.This article is written by Robert Farley and can be read here.
I take issue with the writer on a couple of points. We can and should kill this program now. To say that it is unkillable is to put ourselves at the mercy of the Pentagon and Lockheed Martin. They aren't infallible and they should be held accountable. Will there be a price to pay? Yes. Should we pay it? Most definitely. Like an injury, this will only get worse the longer we let it go untreated. The penicillin for the disease that is this program is to kill it poste haste.
One thing I do agree with the writer on is the fact that this is a warning sign. This is the military industrial complex at its worse and the monster that we were warned about. It would take an extremely strong President and SecDef to do what must be done. We have neither. It would also take men and women of character in Congress. Again we're lacking.
The men and women of the military might be worthy of continued respect by the population. Military leadership...along with the leadership of Lockheed is not. They have literally committed a crime against the public. Tell me again why we don't have an FBI investigation into this program?
Note: After reading this article one thing has become clear. The driver behind the F-35 program is always said to be the USMC. I wonder if that is true now. The author cites USAF experience with the B-2 and the F-22 as being the primary reason for the structure of this program. It now appears to me that the Air Force sat back and watched the Marine Corps doing the blocking and tackling for the F-35 while they were the architects of the program. Deceitful and brilliant.
Kind of interesting that a person trained in the art of research (that is what a PhD signifies) would leave so many glaring holes. There is no evidence to back up the claim that the aircraft (at this time with many significant development problems 12 years after contract award) will have any real value for the money spent. And it will not be survivable against high end threats. I am sure though that on other things, we agree.
ReplyDeleteFarley is an academic and trys to avoid making pronouncements without evidence. he played it pretty straight down the middle in my opinion. he laid out both sides of the argument and allows the reader to come to their own conclusions.
Deletejust like i took his words and used them to indict the program, supporters will do it to boost it.
the part that is stunning is that he has basically laid out the criminal case against leadership in both the Pentagon and Lockheed for corruption. that should be everyones main takeaway.
Holler enough and the adminstration just might cancel it. They will do anything to save a buck. they cut so aggressive as a form of political warfare. Cutting ground forces to deplete freedom of action for the military so they can win the vote against war through a lack of capability. The next administration is going to barely be able to undo the shit they pulled before they gets out of office.
ReplyDeleteYou really want to kill the F-35
If they do it though you won't get the F22s and 6th generation fighters you want.
You'll wind up with 40 year old fighters with new wing boxes, pilots saying its still good and a force that is highly vulnerable to air attack.
My advice is to take what we can get and say thank you.
No doubt the cuts suck and it is tough to watch them spend so much on fighter planes right in the middle of it, but fancy new ground programs won't useful if they get bombed.
If you'd prefer a F22 or a 6th generation fighter that's fine say it, but when you're getting a new fighter at all you've got to show gratitude or the congressional generousity will decline even further.
Top ten reasons to kill the $1.5 trillion F-35 program
ReplyDelete1. Because of system complexity and mismanagement the program is far behind schedule. It was five years to first flight but in the ensuing seven years little has been accomplished and the system is only half-way through development testing. The original ten year development program has extended to eighteen years, and that looks problematical.
2. The test program has been seriously lagging because even after twelve years the system isn't really ready for testing, and as new features are introduced tests must be repeated. Nevertheless, test results have been poor. The plane has experienced cracks in various structural frames, webs and flanges. Combat capability can't be tested any time soon.
3. The overly high-tech F-35 computer system, a major reason for delays, shows no sign of ever being ready. Mission systems software development and delivery to flight test have lagged behind the plan. The program manager says that software remains the program’s number one risk. The 24 million lines of computer code necessary to operate the plane and its combat capability won't be delivered for at least four more years.
4. The F-35 is a poor performer. It lacks payload capacity as a bomber, it lacks maneuverability as a fighter and its large size, high wing loading and poor maneuverability at low speed limit its close air support. The supposed (unproven) stealth feature may not be much of a feature because of radar advances. It's better to defeat radar with electronic countermeasures than to try to evade it. Also the F-35C carrier variant, a major component of the program destined for the Navy and Marine Corps, can't land on a carrier because the tailhook doesn't work.
5. System quality control is poorly managed. A recent DOD Inspector General report found that the Joint Program Office did not ensure that Lockheed Martin and its subcontractors were applying rigor to design, manufacturing, and quality assurance processes, resulting in many quality control shortcomings.
6. While plans call for prospective sales of 700 planes to foreign countries, they do not support it. JSF program partners have either reduced their purchase quantities or, like Canada, avoided any purchase decisions entirely. The program has no non-partner sales orders. It's the Rodney Dangerfield of airplanes -- it gets no respect.
ReplyDelete7. The $1.5 trillion F-35 system costs too much. Development has increased from $34 billion to $74 billion including producing planes that aren't required for testing, unit plane costs have ballooned from an estimated $40-$60 million to over $300 million in low rate production and total acquisition costs are nearing $400 billion.
8. Excessive spending on development and low rate production in the failing F-35 program combined with budget cuts has caused a shift from training and maintenance to operations, and then even operations had to be curtailed. Earlier this year, the Air Force had to temporarily stand down 17 squadrons with a reduction of 44,000 flying hours. Many aircrews had to be recertified, and US pilots are currently flying 120 hours or less per year, less than those in other major countries. Pilot morale is suffering. Acting Secretary of the Air Force Eric Fanning: "If I'm looking at my jet parked on the ramp instead of flying it and I can get a job somewhere else flying, then I'm going to do that."
9. One of the worst features of the F-35, constituting two-thirds of the lifetime cost, is operations and support cost. F-35 operating and support costs are currently projected to be 60 percent higher than those of the existing aircraft it will replace, and even according to the Pentagon, that is unaffordable. High F-35 operating costs are the major factor making total life cycle cost for the F-35 fleet an astronomical $1.5 trillion, the most expensive system in history by far.
10. The F-35 program isn't structured properly and it might get worse. Frank Kendall, Pentagon acquisition chief, a few years ago: "I can spend quite a few minutes on the F-35, but I don't want to. Putting the F-35 into [low rate initial] production years before the first test flight was acquisition malpractice. It should not have been done." And now, despite all its problems, Kendall wants to commit major acquisition malpractice and move into high-rate production five years before the Milestone C production decision scheduled for April 2019. Producing more unproven planes is not a good idea. It's just more acquisition malpractice. Moving to alternate systems makes more sense, and would cost much less.
All this mess remind me a movie....
ReplyDeletewww.youtube.com/watch?v=rQl6xYHanko&feature=youtube_gdata_player
A lot of that data is a few years old and is no longer accurate. Makes for nice debating points though if you are talking to people that don't understand modern air combat.
ReplyDeleteInteresting theory,
DeleteI think that the article that Soloman linked to made a good point that the designers of the F-35 are basing their design off of what they think air combat might be like at some point in the future.
ReplyDeleteSo I think the argument could be made that the F-35 wasn't designed with modern air combat in mind. Pretty expensive gamble if the crystal ball proves to be a bit cloudy.
i think you're missing the most important aspect of this whole thing: the pentagon sees the F35 as a model for other procurement programs. For instance look at all the same tricks being used to get the LCS built: quote impossibly low prices and high flexibility to congress to get funding going? check. Rush "frames" into high rate production before adequate testing is completed or weapons are integrated? check. Claim huge success for having "operational" units while simultaneously explaining away development failures as normal for experimental/testing units? check. Spread production geographically to increase political support regardless of the impact on costs? check. Deliberately starve the existing fleet of upgrades and/or procurement of incrementally improved older models to eliminate the appearance of having any alternatives . . . . the list goes on and on. Expect to see the F-35 procurement approach again and again, starting with the bomber program.
ReplyDeleteYes, excellent point, comparing LCS to JSF, plus the JSF is joint which means a service chief can't touch it.
DeleteOn the LCS, from the 2012 SAR:
Milestone C* current estimate revised from May 2012 to January 2012 as requirement to conduct a Milestone C was rescinded by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) in October 2012. The LCS program is required to conduct annual In-Process Reviews with the USD(AT&L)
*The Milestone C Production and Deployment phase is where a system is produced and deployed. To enter this phase, a program, among other things, must have
7. passed developmental testing and operational assessment,
8. demonstrated that it is interoperable with other relevant systems, and can be supported operationally,
9. shown that it is affordable,
10. be fully funded, and
11. pass Milestone C.
At Milestone C, the MDA authorizes the beginning of low-rate initial production, which is intended to both prepare manufacturing and quality control processes for a higher rate of production and provide test models for operational test and evaluation (OT&E). Upon completion of OT&E, demonstration of adequate control over manufacturing processes,
Similarly, Kendall now wants to "ramp up"F-35 production although development testing is only half completed and test results are poor, in effect rescinding a Milestone C decision as on the LCS.
The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on the JSF for the MC is Dec 2015, long before it would (might) have a combat capability, as on the lCS.
On the LCS, from the SAR:
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is the first attainment of the minimum capability to effectively
employ a weapon, item of equipment, or system of approved specific characteristics, and which is manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped and supported military unit or force. The milestone has been demonstrated with the deployment of LCS 1 to Singapore on March 1, 2013. --Mar 22, 2013 -- Freedom Experiences Two More Power Outages -- "USS Freedom Drifts Towards Guam" -- The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-1) USS Freedom’s first overseas deployment to Southeast Asia has been marred by two more power outages, the U.S. Navy says.-- The most recent two this week — including one March 21 — brings the outage total to three, all during the ship’s transit from Pearl Harbor to Guam en route to Singapore, says U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman Darryn James.