Saturday, May 03, 2014

The best comment on the "sunk cost" canard put forward by F-35 supporters.



My blog post titled, "The biggest lie ever told..." got a good response.  Many of them good, a few questionable but one of the best was from William James...
Irregardless of the capabilities argument, (the F-35 is a "silver bullet", etc.) I keep seeing the fallacy of "sunk cost" at play in many of the supporter's arguments. Many of the supporters of the F-35 argue that since we have spent so much money on the program already, we might as well go the distance. This is commonly known as "throwing good money after bad."
The correct economic decision should be "where do we go from here?" Irregardless of any money already spent, decisions must be made that only consider present and future costs, not just in money, but also in "opportunity costs" What are we giving up if we stay the course? What are the consequences? And, most importantly, what do we REALLY have to work with. If we had to go to war in 2015, what would the F-35s that we have in inventory bring to the fight? Could that same job be done quicker and cheaper with other assets?
Too many supporters have fallen in love with the F-35s potential based on paper projections. Big deal.
My so-far unbuilt airplane that I'm going to pitch will be invisible in ALL wave lengths (if only the tech comes on-line in time) My point is that perhaps someday the F-35 will be capable of all that has been promised but can we, should we, continue to wait and bleed cash, time and goodwill. Can we as a nation even afford that luxury? Can our allies?
I think the best decision could be arrived at if we come to the conclusion that we WILL be at war within five years with a near-peer adversary. What assets do we currently have to bring to the fight and what can we get our hands on that will get the job done in the next five years if not sooner. Perhaps this will help sharpen the focus of our decision makers. Perhaps the events in The Ukraine and the South China Sea are already doing just that. One can hope.
Many said much the same but this comment by William James sings to me.  It takes the argument one step further than I took it and breaks it down cowboy style.

Reason no longer figures into this debate.

A reasonable person would say that enough is enough.  No, this isn't about reason.  This has become a matter of faith.  Despite evidence to the contrary the supporters of this program want to BELIEVE that the plane will deliver.  It hasn't since its been in development and the requirements have been steadily watered down but they fervently believe that it will turn around.

Faith is believing in something despite the lack of evidence.  How do you argue with that? 

SIDENOTE:  James Bacon (another one of my frequent commenters I'm proud to say) gave this link to a James Hasik article.  Read it here but the takeaway?  The F-35 will soon consume 40% of US defense procurement spending.  Let that sink in.  One airplane will gobble up 40% of the US defense procurement budget.  Amazing.  We are heading into dangerous territory.  If left unchecked Lockheed Martin will soon be the only US defense corporation.  I once shot down that argument but Hasik is compelling.  We're about to inaugurate a government sponsored corporate monopoly because of decisions being made by leadership today that will cost us dearly tomorrow.

21 comments :

  1. Oh darn, just before the dust settles on the previous F-35 discussion post, here we go for another Sortie. I think Solomon has realized that the most responsive/popular posts are F-35 posts. Any more eyeballs falling here and Solomon might even make this site commercial.......lol.

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    1. no its not for the shock effect its to wake people up. the F-35 is destroying the Marine Corps, has put our allies in jeopardy and is bankrupting the US. it needs to be stopped.

      my personal big issues?

      1. getting Amos out of the Commandant's chair.
      2. killing the F-35.
      3. ending V-22 procurement.
      4. revitalizing the MEU and destroying the SPMAGTF-CR.
      5. getting the Marine Corps hardcore again.
      6. reducing the size of the civilian workforce.
      7. getting the US Army feet wet.
      8. seeing the Royal Marines mechanized.
      and the list could go on.

      but yeah. i want the F-35 dead!

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  2. But Solomon should take heart from the fact that American Mercenary's thought process on the Pacific Stryker/Amphib usage idea got its inspiration from his previous blog on the F-35.

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    1. i do. believe me, if big Army adopts American Mercenary's plan then i'll tell every doggie i ever see that the father of the Army Amphibious Force is actually a Marine!

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  3. I've been saying it for a while, but we no longer have defense companies, we have "Contractors" that function like Soviet design bureaus.

    They exist in the rarified atmoshere of being able to navigate the tortuous maze of Dept of Defense acquisitions for decades long programs, but completely inept at fielding competitive products in the short term. Were it not for the largess of the US DoD, they would be bankrupt due to ineptitude.

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    1. i know you've been saying the same, the stars just aligned to where a comment needed to be highlighted.....i like the idea of soviet design bureaus instead of defense companies. they're in essence being supported by the government in a quasi corporate/government partnership (to use a word thats in fashion with the pentagon). its disgusting, its inefficient and its probably criminal.

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    2. Well, the Defence Industry is still on a Cold War Footing, despite there being no cold war. By continously spending gargantuan amounts of money on a select few superweapons you are not motivating/decieving the New Russians and Chinese into bankrupting themselves by matching you nut bolt to nut bolt on these weapons. Believe me, the USSR tried to match almost everything that you did in the same fashion, the Turbine Engine T-80 tank is one prime example of soviet "Prima Donna" equipment modeled or fashioned blindly after western ideas taking no account of costs, rapid manufacture, new engines and logistics etc. Nowadays the whole world recognizes that they cannot outspend or even equalspend what USA is doing now. Even the chinese know that. Thats why they are going in for stuff that is simple better than what they already have or just something better that what the other guy has. In short, while you spend huge monies on revolutionary weapons, they are doing the Insurgent Mentality of spending least and still scaring the shit out of neighbours and regional bullying.

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  4. The original JSF Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD)--created in the 1990s and signed off on at the beginning of the last decade is now obsolete. Even if the F-35 was to work to spec (unlikely) it won't be able to take on emerging threats and will be way too expensive to own and operate for smaller threats.

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    1. By any chance, would you have a link to that original document or something like it ?

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  5. I've been thinking about this for the past few days: the USAF has been proposing the zero out an entire weapons systems (A-10) to fund its acquisition of F-35. The trouble is that the savings only buys about 5 aircraft per year. How on earth is the USAF going to be able to afford to buy 80 aircraft per year at FRP when even after canceling programs, they can only afford 29 F-35s in the next fiscal year?

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    1. i've been shouting that the F-35 is in a death spiral and the Italians, the Netherlands, the reduced buys by the S. Koreans, Japanese and Brits all point to it being true.

      the sad reality is that even if they push it over the finish line the numbers will never be close to what was projected. the program office knows this and so do the JCS. they're just too stubborn to admit it and to stupid to adjust the plan when new facts become apparent.

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  6. I didn't need to pull out my old micro econ books for this, as defined by a google search:

    sunk cost
    A sunk cost is money that has already been spent and cannot be recovered. Sunk costs are also called retrospective costs. ***Logic dictates that because sunk costs will not change -- no matter what actions are taken -- they should not play a role in decision-making.****

    But even if you entertained the argument, we have still only invested 20% of the entire program cost, http://breakingdefense.com/2012/03/f-35-total-costs-soar-to-1-5-trillion-lockheed-defends-program/, why would you continue to pour money into a bad deal.

    There is a reason why most people don't run companies, it is the same thing as battlefield triage, why cant these "trained" officers, use the knowledge they earned from leading men/Marines on the battlefield and apply it to this situation. (Oh wait, Amos is pilot, please disregard my comment reference leading Marines into battle.) Coldly, some live and some die, you have limited resources. Fucking Douches! Semper Fi, most of the time.

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  7. If "Sunk Cost" didn't save the EVF, JLTVR, Crusader, etc, why does it suddenly become a valid argument when applied to the F-35 "Albino Elephant"?

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  8. Hey Solomon...just for shits and giggles..........you know that the A-10 is dead meat vs a peer oponente right?
    http://www.dvidshub.net/news/128528/unleash-hogs-idahos-10-warthogs-hold-green-flag-record#.U2Un4GddZMt

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    1. Reading that article, I hope you are being sarcastic: it's pretty positive about the A-10...

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    2. Of course Charley...i love the Hog...but many people keep talking lies about it...

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  9. The part of sunk cost which represents money spent on F-35 development is in itself not a bad thing. Unfortunately a lot of procurement money has been spent in violation of the law.

    Five years after the start of development, the so-called F-35 critical design reviews (CDR) improperly (because of no Milestone C production decision) provided the go-ahead for the low rate initial production (LRIP) of half-baked faulty prototypes which don't meet performance requirements and later must be modified at great time and expense, assuming that development will ever be completed. And the US seeks to train on and sell these miserable products abroad!

    At the variants CDRs the F-35 design was not stable. Many prominent and innovative design features were still in development (and remain in development) including: electronic warfare antenna system, millions of lines of software including the logistical system ALIS, helmet-mounted display system and weapons integration. Also the carrier variant's arrestment system, a known geometrical departure from proven designs, was not demonstrated to work during the CV CDR in 2007 and still doesn't work.

    All of these F-35 features, and more, were still unresolved problems more than six years later as noted in the recent DOT&E 2013 F-35 test report. The one innovative F-35 feature which has proven itself is the STOVL engine/fan system, which from known reports has performed faultlessly with some minor exceptions (e.g. fan door hinge).

    Regarding the law: The Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America
    Title 32-National Defense, 213.3
    (5) Technical uncertainty shall be continually assessed. Progressive commitments of resources which incur program risk will be made only when confidence in program outcome is sufficiently high to warrant going ahead. . .

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  10. from the archives:
    Jun 27, 2007
    F-35 Navy Version Undergoes Successful Design Review, Readies for Production

    (Fort Worth, Texas, June 27, 2007) -- The U.S. Navy's F-35C Lightning II carrier variant has completed its Air System Critical Design Review (CDR), a significant development milestone that verifies the design maturity of the aircraft and its associated systems. The review was conducted June 18-22 at Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, and involved officials from Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office, the F-35 international-participant nations and the F-35 contractor team. Completion of the CDR is a prerequisite for the F-35C to move into Low Rate Initial Production.(end news report)

    This was pure irresponsible bullshit by NAVAIR. The officers involved should be made to walk the plank. There was no more F-35 "design maturity" in 2007 than there is now. They never demonstrated that the hook worked, on top of all the other F-35 features that didn't work, and the part about "the CDR is a prerequisite for the F-35C to move into Low Rate Initial Production" was a fabrication.

    Moving into production requires a favorable production decision, which is currently scheduled for Apr-Oct 2019 -- and good luck on that.

    PS: What got me onto this CDR angle was when I ran across a long-ago blog comment on the hook malfeasance by Eric Palmer, so hat tip to Eric. He foresaw the hook problem. --So then I said: hey, if they screwed up on the hook, how about all the other F-35 design features that haven't been proven to work and yet passed the Critical Design Review long ago (2006-2007)? And how about that illegal production decision?

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  11. The Comanche and the Albatross
    About Our Neck Was Hung
    Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF

    F-35. We have no other choice.
    —Gen Mark A. Welsh III
    Chief of Staff, US Air Force

    The Air Force intended eventually to replace much of the post-Vietnam fighter fleet with the F-35A.

    ..Instead, the program has been troubled, characterized by the Pentagon’s acquisition chief as “acquisition malpractice,” and finds itself well behind schedule and over budget. Rather than an affordable, capable fighter aircraft, operational in large numbers by 2015, the F-35 continues to arrive late and cost more than anticipated.

    ....At the heart of any JSF discussion lies the belief that the program cannot be cancelled—that any attempt is doomed to failure because of the spread of the program structure in the United States and internationally. Despite any great unwillingness to end the program, doing so is certainly not impossible. Clearly, the Army’s experience with the Comanche is instructive. . .

    ... the rationale for terminating the F-35 programming to allow a redesign of the tactical air (TACAIR) enterprise remains the same: some of the capabilities those funds would provide are no longer consistent with the changed operational environment, and it does not serve either the United States or our partner nations to continue on the current path. Even if funding were unlimited, reasons might still exist for terminating the F-35. Specifically, its performance has not met initial requirements, its payload is low, its range is short, and espionage efforts by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) may have compromised the aircraft long in advance of its introduction. . .

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  12. For General Dynamics the EFV was a pretty big cash cow, we kept throwing money at it because those fifty year old vehicles "have to be replaced" and if we stopped there was also "no alternative". Yet one day the magic purse ran out of money for General Dynamics and when they realized no amount of lobbing was going to restart it, Poof! as if by magic, we can offer a lower cost alternative that meets most of the requirements and is better than the current AAV7. Much more money is at stake with the F35. What could LM pull out of the hat if it really had to face the music? Necessity is the mother of invention.

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  13. F-35 Milestones
    Milestone B 2001
    CDR 35A Feb 2006 (Critical Design Review)
    CDR 35B Oct 2006
    CDR 35C Jun 2007
    Milestone B re-approval 2012
    Milestone C Apr-Oct 2019

    What should have happened at CDR
    Knowledge Point 2: Critical design review midway through product development
    Complete 90 percent of engineering design drawing packages to ensure design is stable
    Demonstrate with system integration prototype that design performs as intended
    Identify critical manufacturing processes and key system characteristics
    Establish targets and growth plan for product reliability
    Conduct independent cost estimate
    Conduct system critical design review to ensure design meets requirements

    --from Defense Acquisitions
    http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662837.pdf

    But according to a LockMart Report
    F-35 Year in Review - 2005
    p. 4
    "Air Vehicle looks forward to the start of detailed design for the F-35 carrier variant (CV) in May 2006. At that point, all three versions of the aircraft will have entered detailed design – a significant indicator of program progress."

    The variants were just entering detailed design in 2006 and yet they passed the CDR and were approved for production! That's criminal.
    http://www.jsf.mil/downloads/documents/F-35_2005_Year-In-Review.PDF

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