Its faded from memory but General Mattis made one mistake that I have difficulty forgiving him on.
He fired Colonel Dowdy during the invasion of Baghdad.
Officers get fired all the time. Alot more often than the general public would believe, but this one was unusual...and for a reason that will stun the uninitiated. He was fired because he cared about his men.
It was a hush-hush episode inside the Regiment...even inside the Marine Corps. Few people outside of the head shed knew the what's and the why's. Check out this old article from the Wall Street Journal...
It was presumed the Iraqis had chemical weapons, so the plan was to avoid engaging them directly. Col. Dowdy's unit was to act as a decoy, diverting Mr. Hussein's soldiers and allowing the other U.S. regiments to rush in from the northwest through a gap in Iraqi defenses to get to Baghdad.Its hard to explain, but for some unGodly reason the run into Baghdad seemed to turn into race.
Col. Dowdy's route would take him through the city of Nasiriyah. Another Marine unit, called Task Force Tarawa, was charged with keeping order there. Pentagon officials assumed the city would offer little resistance because it had long been oppressed by Mr. Hussein. That assumption turned out to be wrong.
The plan began to unravel in Nasiriyah. When Col. Dowdy and his men arrived outside the city, they found their passage blocked by a massive firefight. Word filtered back that Task Force Tarawa had suffered casualties, including 18 dead. Adding to the confusion was a U.S. Army supply unit, which had mistakenly stumbled into Nasiriyah. Several soldiers in that unit were dead. Others, including Pvt. Jessica Lynch, had been taken prisoner.
Outside the city, Col. Dowdy and his staff debated what to do. Several hundred trucks in Col. Dowdy's train lacked armor, and squeezing through a fierce battle zone would be complicated, especially on Nasiriyah's narrow streets.
A potential 150-mile bypass around Nasiriyah didn't seem feasible. Col. Dowdy wasn't sure he had enough fuel and didn't know what resistance he might face. The First Regiment was stuck.
The halt was anathema to Gen. Mattis, a devotee of a modern military doctrine known as "maneuver warfare." Though Marines have practiced the technique for years, the Iraqi war was its first large-scale test. Instead of following rigid battle plans and attacking on well-defined fronts, this tactic calls for smaller forces to move quickly over combat zones, exploiting opportunities and sowing confusion among the enemy. The technique is summed up in Gen. Mattis' radio call name: "Chaos."
Both the US Army and USMC had exposed supply lines.
Everyone involved was operating on ragged sleep, worries about being ambushed and the fear that chemical weapons would be used (that is stress on another level).
The USMC was not equipped for an extended assault deep into Iraq. Even the US Army, that is designed for these types of operations, had to call a halt to its advance.
In the fighting around Nasiriyah the Marine Corps lost 8 AAVs in heavy fighting. If you've seen pictures of AAV burned down to their treads it happened here.
But after the city was pacified the call to push forward at break neck pace went out. This is when Colonel Dowdy took what I consider an operational pause, Mattis took as command indecision and history seems to have forgotten about.
For a fuller telling of this tale, read the command history but even better just Google it and read the different accounts. My personal lesson learned from this?
* The Marine Corps is not equipped for extended land movement against opposition. Even in 2003 we were too lightly equipped. Today we're even lighter.
* Operational temp depends on conditions encountered by your forces. It can't come from higher headquarters.
* Concepts should be tested against worst case scenarios. Playing the game so that your ideas win will serve you badly in real world situations.
We're making the same mistake today that we did in 2003...the difference?. The USMC is HOPING that air power can make up for a lack of armored protection.
It can't and it won't.
Colonel Dowdy saved the lives of his men because he did not conduct hasty assault after hasty assault in the race to Baghdad. Will the next Regimental Commander be as brave?
A matter of trust too. A Division commander should know his Regiment commanders. If the Regiment commander was good, and given that plans change because of what the enemy does or because of new ISR discoveries. The higher echelon can sometimes fix this situation by making a call down to that Regimental commander and just ask, "how do you want to handles this?" It sounded like a company or two of logistically sustainable M-60 tanks in USMC colors could have helped.
ReplyDeleteyou nailed it! Dowdy was a rock star before this mess. the guy was beloved and was gonna pick up a star. i don't know what bee got up Mattis' bonnet but he wrecked this guy. Mattis knew this guy was of character and high morals but he still unleashed the dogs on him.
Deletea sad day in the history of our Corps and one we don't talk about.
Exactly right. Recon pull instead of Command push. You go through the trouble of selecting men of the right character and skill, train them, educate them, then second guess them and torpedo their decisions (and careers)?
ReplyDeleteIf you can't trust your people, why should your people trust you?
We;ve been saying it here for a while: Without decent armor, the USMC is heading towards being like the UK Royal Marine Commandos, equipped for raiding along the littoral, but little else. They'll storm ashore, drive inland, encounter heavy resistance and call in F35s with too few JDAMs, then slip back out to sea.
And any USMC armor, be it AAV upgrade or MPC or whatever, is going to need an active protection system because otherwise, they are going to be shredded by RPG and ATGW.
It's sad because the next 20-30 years, the USMC as it is configured today, is going to be in high demand. If the air component guys bankrupt the Corps, the ground component guys aren't going to be doing anything except call in air strikes for when they run into trouble. It's going to be a butched up JTAC party.
well speaking of JTAC thats another Marine Corps story that doesn't get talked about.
Deleteyou ever wonder why i never rail against the USAF providing air support (well the A-10 community)? there was a very famous A-10 incident that had them shredding a couple of our AAVs and killing Marines (about 17).
Marines took it as a case of some dumbass USAF pilot not having proper vehicle recognition. its a bit more complicated. we didn't have BFT and JTAC cleared the guy to fire. he rolled in on what he thought was enemy vehicles and good guys died.
so besides turning into the Royal Marines and only being able to conduct raids, we're also setting ourselves up for failure because air power is fickle. visibility, units not being where they're suppose to be, improper weapons load to deal with the threat, night time conditions will all play hell with our plans.
also a well said about recon pull instead of command push.
Mattis is one helluva a guy but the worship his very ground thing has gotta stop. i occasionally forget this story and do the popular thing but the reality is rather stark. at a time and place he chose flawed mission over the welfare of his guys. mission first troops second is a good motto unless you're one of the troops in the grinder.
I'm more familiar with 3/3's "Thunder Run" up to/through Baghdad. My OPS Sergeant Major was a Tank Platoon Sergeant during that movement north, and if you get him talking he'll tell you stories about that movement that will leave you shaking your head about risky maneuvers. More than a few times they called in BUFF strikes where everyone would button up in armor because they were danger close and it was the only way to pacify resistance at key choke points. And this is an Armor Brigade filled with Abrams and Bradleys. I'd shudder to think what a Marine unit in thin skins would have to do to take ground.
ReplyDeletei marvel at the Thunder Run and come to one conclusion when I watched the footage of it.
Deletethe USMC lacks the resources to even do a 'baby' run. but thats as it should be. its an Army mission and i'm glad they were able to get it done. what irks me is that the USMC saluted and said roger that and took on a mission that strained us to the breaking point.
few people will ever know how close it all came to being a failed mission. to this day i'm thinking that the US Army called a halt to the advance to save our bacon. we were worn out and i don't know if we could have maintained the pace without suffering extreme casualties.
as it stands i can't help but wonder if some guys died unnecessarily.
you're spot on AM. an Armor Brigade can do it. its DESIGNED for it. a Marine Regiment? not so much.
Bing West covered this in his book The March Up. If you have not already done so I recommend giving it a read. Gen. Matthis was also the guy who refused to send Marine helos to evac wounded SF guys who called in a big frickin bomb by accident on their own poz. Read The Only Thing Worth Dying For which covers this in detail.
ReplyDeleteMaybe Mattis will write a book and cover both and give his reasons. Obviously I was not present for either so I'm willing to give the general the benefit of the doubt in light of all the right decisions he made over the years.
thanks for the info Michael! i'm going to order those books today!
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