I just read an interview with one of the retired Army generals regarding what has been happenning in Gaza. Firstly, he says mistakes and bad decisions happen in war; that is a given. Secondly, the eqipment in use, like the M113 are the result of two decisions/conditions. One: the budget constraints have influenced the purchase of new equipment. The available monies have to be parcelled between the Land Manouver Army and the Air Force and Intelligence. The largest slice of the budget was given to the Intelligence Corps, and this inludes cyber, battlefield intelligence, Zayad (the Digital Army network). The Air Force was in second place but no new fighters have been purchased in the last 10 years and all are waiting for the end of 2016 when the F-35 will be delivered. A lot of UAVs have been purchased, some small ones for the artillery and the various field regiments. The Navy is getting a new submarine. This is why the Namer and Merkava4 programs have been cut. There is only one regiment, the 401st., with Merkava4 tanks that have Trophy systems on them (and these have given good account of themselves). The decision is also connected to the debate in the Army regarding the relevance of Fire versus Manouver. The Defence Minister was the Head of GHQ a few years ago with General Gantz (current GHQ Head) his operational head and they both favoured less Manouver elements and purchasing accurate fire lements (optically/GPS guided rockets, etc.). They cut the Heavy Manouver elements and decommissioned many older obsolescent tank units. And this was following the 2006 Second Lebanon war, in which it was evident that the heavy manouver units were the only factor that made an impression, even when it was sometims used inappropriately or hesitantly or incorrectly. That lesson has again been forgotten. It must be admitted that the current conflict is taking place in a very different terrain, wher the manouver is not possible; but the heavy element support is essential for infantry advance. Fire lements are also essential, but fraught with danger for the non-combatants - as in the case of the UNRA school incident where a stray 120mm mortar caused 15 killed. I suspect that following this war the Commissions that will be examining the lessons learned will reccommend ordering more Namer and Merkava, both with Trophy or Iron Fist active protection systems. I wonder what will be decided regarding the recently developed Bodyguard Iron Fist defended armoured personnel carrier. It has a smaller signature and faster manouver capability and may be more suited to urban fighting???? I would like to hear your opinions.
I don't see any type of weapon, you probably right Sol. That's look like MCP.
ReplyDeleteI see many lucrative target indicators in view, antennae draw fire. There must be a better way!
ReplyDeleteI just read an interview with one of the retired Army generals regarding what has been happenning in Gaza.
ReplyDeleteFirstly, he says mistakes and bad decisions happen in war; that is a given. Secondly, the eqipment in use, like the M113 are the result of two decisions/conditions. One: the budget constraints have influenced the purchase of new equipment. The available monies have to be parcelled between the Land Manouver Army and the Air Force and Intelligence. The largest slice of the budget was given to the Intelligence Corps, and this inludes cyber, battlefield intelligence, Zayad (the Digital Army network). The Air Force was in second place but no new fighters have been purchased in the last 10 years and all are waiting for the end of 2016 when the F-35 will be delivered. A lot of UAVs have been purchased, some small ones for the artillery and the various field regiments. The Navy is getting a new submarine.
This is why the Namer and Merkava4 programs have been cut. There is only one regiment, the 401st., with Merkava4 tanks that have Trophy systems on them (and these have given good account of themselves).
The decision is also connected to the debate in the Army regarding the relevance of Fire versus Manouver. The Defence Minister was the Head of GHQ a few years ago with General Gantz (current GHQ Head) his operational head and they both favoured less Manouver elements and purchasing accurate fire lements (optically/GPS guided rockets, etc.). They cut the Heavy Manouver elements and decommissioned many older obsolescent tank units.
And this was following the 2006 Second Lebanon war, in which it was evident that the heavy manouver units were the only factor that made an impression, even when it was sometims used inappropriately or hesitantly or incorrectly. That lesson has again been forgotten. It must be admitted that the current conflict is taking place in a very different terrain, wher the manouver is not possible; but the heavy element support is essential for infantry advance. Fire lements are also essential, but fraught with danger for the non-combatants - as in the case of the UNRA school incident where a stray 120mm mortar caused 15 killed.
I suspect that following this war the Commissions that will be examining the lessons learned will reccommend ordering more Namer and Merkava, both with Trophy or Iron Fist active protection systems. I wonder what will be decided regarding the recently developed Bodyguard Iron Fist defended armoured personnel carrier. It has a smaller signature and faster manouver capability and may be more suited to urban fighting????
I would like to hear your opinions.