Of particular note to U.S. observers was the Egyptian attempt to launch air-mobile attacks with helicopter-borne infantry. These attacks were met with disaster as the Israelis shot down more than fourteen helicopters. For a U.S. Army that was used to using their helicopters for quick mobile insertion, this came as a wake-up call that a modern opponent could render this tactic useless. The brief war (about two weeks) caused an upwards of 10,000 killed, and hundreds of tanks destroyed. The COIN-centric U.S. Army was shocked by the deadly power of conventional warfare.The above is just a primer. READ THE WHOLE THING! I don't know this guy but he makes a compelling case of why we're reliving the time after the Vietnam War (quite honestly I don't think he goes far enough) when it comes to where/what our services are facing in general and the US Army in particular.
After you read his article, ask yourself this question.
If we froze every program in progress right now and looked at the threat as it now exists....not those that were projected 10-20 years ago but as they are now...how many of those programs would continue?